Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

9-29-2011

Summary of Ford v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55
Alan R. Smith
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith, Alan R., "Summary of Ford v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55" (2011). Nevada Supreme Court
Summaries. 229.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/229

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Ford v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55 (Sept. 29, 2011) 1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – Pandering of Prostitution and Intent
Summary
Appeal from a district court judgment of conviction, by way of a jury verdict, for
pandering of prostitution.
Disposition / Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 201.300(1)(a) is not unconstitutionally
overbroad because of its specific intent requirement. The statute is also not unconstitutionally
overbroad because it punishes speech promoting criminal conduct, which is not protected by the
First Amendment. Further, the statute is not vague because it: (1) provides sufficient notice of
prohibited conduct, and (2) provides law enforcement officers sufficient standards with which to
act. Finally, the Court found that NRS 201.300(1)(a) applies to undercover sting operations.
However, the Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial because the district court
failed to provide the jury with a specific intent instruction.
Factual and Procedural History
Jerome Ford (“Ford”) was convicted of pandering of prostitution. His conviction arose
from a prostitution sting operation, which the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
conducted on the Las Vegas strip. Leesa Fazal (“Fazal”), an undercover officer posing as a
prostitute, was wearing a wire underneath her dress when Ford approached her. During their
conversation, Ford elicited from Fazal that she was “working.” Thereafter, Ford explained the
nature of his business and the services that he could provide Fazal, including protection,
management, care, advice on collecting money from a “trick,” and instruction on recognizing an
undercover officer. After Fazal indicated that she did not employ the services of a pimp, Ford
suggested that she should work with him, boasting that Fazal would realize a greater profit
through his services.
The State of Nevada charged Ford with pandering of prostitution and attempted
pandering of prostitution. During Ford’s trial, the jury did not receive an instruction on specific
intent. Instead, the jury received a general intent instruction, which contained the text of NRS
201.300(1)(a) and enumerated the elements for general intent under NRS 193.190. Additionally,
the general intent instruction indicated that motive was not an element of the crime charged and
that the State did not have to prove motive to convict. Ford did not object to the failure to
instruct the jury on specific intent.
The jury returned a guilty verdict for Ford, and he was sentenced as a habitual criminal to
five to twenty years in prison. Ford appealed his conviction of pandering for prostitution,
arguing that NRS 201.300(1)(a): (1) is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment,
(2) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
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(3) does not apply because the target, Fazal, was an undercover police officer for whom
becoming a prostitute was not a realistic possibility.
Discussion
The Court began its analysis by construing the challenged statute. NRS 201.300(1)(a)
provides that “a person who: (a) Induces, persuades, encourages, inveigles, entices, or compels a
person to become a prostitute or to continue to engage in prostitution… is guilty of pandering.” 2
While “prostitute” and “prostitution” are statutorily defined terms, the verbs “induces, persuades,
encourages, inveigles, entices, or compels” are without definition. Moreover, unlike most
modern criminal statutes, NRS 201.300(1)(a) does not designate a mens rea, or bad-mind,
requirement.
Given the absence of an express mens rea requirement, Ford asserted that the statute
imposed strict liability, based on cause and effect rather than intent. The Court disagreed,
finding that NRS 201.300(1)(a) requires a defendant to act with the specific intent of inducing,
persuading, encouraging, inveigling, enticing, or compelling his target to take up, or continue to
engage in, prostitution. Thereafter, the Court delineated five factors influencing its conclusion.
First, the Court found that the mere absence of an express intent requirement does not
automatically indicate that a statute imposes strict liability. While strict liability offenses do
exist in the criminal law and do not inevitably violate constitutional requirements, such offenses
nevertheless receive a disfavored status. 3 As such, courts require more than mere omission of a
mens rea requirement from the statutory definition to construe a statute as imposing strict
liability. 4
Second, the Court determined that the history and apparent purpose of NRS
201.300(1)(a) support construing the statute to require a defendant to act with the specific intent
of encouraging the target to become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. NRS
201.300(1)(a) closely mirrors the Mann Act, which did not focus on whether prostitution actually
occurred, but rather, whether the defendant intended to prostitute the target. 5 Similarly, Nevada
case law recognizes that NRS 201.300(1)(a) concentrates on whether the defendant sought to
recruit a target into the practice of prostitution, not whether prostitution actually occurred. 6
Thus, the law distinguishes between a pimp who solicits business for a prostitute, and a panderer
who recruits a target for prostitution. 7 In contrast to the pimp/prostitute relationship, the
panderer’s target is not considered a co-conspirator, but rather, the victim of a crime.
The Court also argued that if it were to construe NRS 201.300(1)(a) as imposing strict
liability, the effect would be to shift the statute’s “focus from the panderer’s efforts to recruit
2
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prostitutes to the success of the recruiting program.” 8 As such, liability would stem from
whether the target engaged in prostitution, regardless of the panderer’s intent.
NRS 175.301 was a further influence on the Court’s analysis of the history and purpose
of NRS 201.300(1)(a). NRS 175.301 required corroboration of a target’s testimony during a
“trial for… inveigling, enticing or taking away any [person] for the purpose of prostitution.” 9
The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s inclusion of the “for the purpose of” language in the
NRS 201.300(1)(a)’s companion statute confirmed the reasonableness of construing NRS
201.300(1)(a) as requiring specific intent.
Third, the Court determined that there are no grammatical barriers to reading a specific
intent requirement into NRS 201.300(1)(a). Furthermore, the statutory language supports such an
interpretation. The Court noted that even in the absence of an adverb or phrase indicating fault,
fault may be inherent in the verbs within the statute.
Fourth, the Court noted that throughout the country, the statutory formulations of
pandering laws vary; however, no decision interpreting a pandering statute applies anything
other than a specific intent requirement. For example, in a recent decision, the California
Supreme Court held that “pandering is a specific intent crime.” 10
Finally, the Court noted that courts are careful to avoid construing a statute to impose
strict liability where the absence of an intent requirement would encompass a broad range of
innocuous conduct. 11 Such a broad sweep would criminalize innocent conduct, while rendering
the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause and the First
Amendment.
Overbreadth Analysis
The Court acknowledged that Ford was correct in his argument that NRS 201.300(1)(a)
permits conviction based on speech. However, while the First Amendment provides broad
protection for speech, such protection is not unlimited. 12 In fact, criminal prohibitions of speech
intended to encourage or instigate illegal activities are well-rooted in the legal system. 13 Such
speech is not afforded First Amendment Protection because it promotes criminal conduct. 14
According to the Court, pandering is a variety of criminal solicitation, and statutes
prohibiting solicitation punish a type of speech: “asking another to commit a crime.” 15 Such
prohibition is narrowed to illegal employment offers in the case of pandering, which prohibits
encouraging another to become, or remain, a prostitute. Moreover, where prostitution is illegal,
as in Nevada, the First Amendment does not protect pandering.
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In addition, Ford asserted that NRS 201.300(1)(a) permits conviction of individuals who
did not act with the requisite specific intent. However, the Court determined that such issues do
not establish overbreadth, but rather, are examples of the inferences that jurors can draw from the
facts. The Court also concluded that NRS 201.300(1)(a) does not prohibit the advocacy of
prostitution in the abstract because it requires the specific intent of encouraging a target to
become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution.
Vagueness Analysis
Ford asserted two vagueness arguments: (1) pursuant to Silvar v. District Court, 16 NRS
201.300(1)(a) is unconstitutionally indeterminate because conviction depends on the effect of a
defendant’s conduct upon the target, and (2) the statute violates the due process principles
enunciated in Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Attorney General, 17 by failing to define its
operative verbs. The Court disagreed, holding that NRS 201.300(1)(a), due to its requirement of
specific intent, is distinguishable from the statutes considered in Silvar and Flamingo Paradise
Gaming.
In Silvar, the Court considered a county ordinance that prohibited loitering “in a manner
and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting for or
procuring another to commit an act of prostitution.” 18 In construing the statute, the Court
determined that the statute’s prohibition was triggered by a hypothetical viewer’s interpretation
of a defendant’s loitering rather than the defendant’s subjective intent.
Unlike the city ordinance in Silvar, NRS 201.300(1)(a) requires that the defendant
actually intends for his target to engage in prostitution. Under NRS 201.300(1)(a), conviction
does not turn on a subjective determination regarding the defendant’s conduct, but rather, entails
a question of fact – whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent. Additionally, the Court
determined that the omission of a definition for the operative verbs in NRS 201.300(1)(a) does
not render the statute void for vagueness. While the words induces, persuades, encourages,
inveigles, entices, or compels are not defined in the statute, they are all words with common
dictionary definitions.
Statutory Analysis
Ford also asserted two statutory arguments. First, Ford argued that NRS 201.300(1)(a)
did not apply in his situation, regardless of his intent, because Fazal testified that she did not
intend to become a prostitute, nor to continue to engage in prostitution. Alternatively, Ford
suggested that, at most, the State could charge him with attempted pandering.
The Court noted that in focusing on the victim’s intent, Ford conflated pandering of
prostitution, an inchoate crime requiring specific intent, with the crime of prostitution. NRS

16

Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 129 P.3d 682 (2006).
Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Attorney Gen., 125 Nev. 502, 514, 217 P.3d 546, 554-55 (2009).
18
Silvar, 122 Nev. at 289, 129 P.3d at 682 (2006) (citing CLARK CNTY. ORDINANCE § 10.08.030 (2006).
17

201.300(1)(a) looks to the defendant’s intent, not the victim’s. 19 The Court also recognized that
the crime of pandering is complete upon some uttering of encouragement for the target to
become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution.
Additionally, the Court found that NRS 175.301, the statute requiring corroboration of a
witness’s testimony to convict a defendant of pandering, demonstrates that NRS 201.300(1)(a)
applies to undercover sting operations. After the Court reversed a pandering conviction on the
ground that a police officer could not corroborate a fellow officer’s testimony, the Legislature
amended NRS 175.301(2) to exclude from the corroboration requirement witnesses who were
on-duty police officers at the relevant time. 20 Notwithstanding repeal of NRS 175.301’s
corroboration requirement in 2005, the statute’s provision excluding an undercover police
officer’s testimony from the corroboration requirement demonstrated the Legislature’s intent for
NRS 175.301 to apply to undercover sting operations.
As to Ford’s attempted pandering argument, the Court looked to People v. Zambia, 21 a
California Supreme Court decision involving similar facts. There, the Court held that “the crime
of pandering is complete when the defendant ‘encourages another person to become a
prostitute.” 22 Further, the fact that Ford mistakenly believed Fazal to be a prostitute is not
sufficient to overcome conviction under NRS 201.300(1)(a). In determining a defendant’s
culpability for a solicitation-type crime, courts look to the facts as the defendant believed them to
be. 23 Finally, the Court noted that a defendant could be convicted of attempted pandering if he
sought to recruit the target for prostitution, but the target failed to hear the defendant’s
solicitations.
Conclusion
NRS 201.300(1)(a) is not unconstitutionally overbroad because it requires a specific
intent of inducing, persuading, encouraging, inveigling, enticing, or compelling a target to take
up, or continue to engage in, prostitution. Additionally, NRS 201.300(1)(a) is not
unconstitutionally vague, as the statue provides both notice of the prohibited conduct and
sufficient standards to guide the actions of law enforcement officers. Finally, NRS 201.300(1)(a)
applies to undercover sting operations.
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